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EXPANDING THE LIABILITY OF MANAGING
UNDERWRITERS UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT
OF 1933
INTRODUCTION
The Securities Act of 1933' (Securities Act or Act) provides express
civil remedies to investors for material misrepresentations or omissions
that occur during the offering process.' Underwriters, 3 as key partici-
pants in this process,4 are often sued under the Act,5 but their liability
has been limited to the price of the securities they underwrite.6 Specifi-
cally, managing underwriters7 have not been held liable to those who
purchased securities from other underwriters in a syndicate.'
1. Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act or Act), ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1982)).
2. See §§ 11, 12 and 15 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 1, o (1982).
3. The term "underwriter" is defined in § 2(11) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77b(11) (1982), as
any person who has purchased from an issuer with a view to, or offers or sells
for an issuer in connection with, the distribution of any security, or participates
or has a direct or indirect participation in any such undertaking, or participates
or has a participation in the direct or indirect underwriting of any such
undertaking.
Section 2(11) excludes persons "whose interest is limited to a commission from an under-
writer or dealer not in excess of the usual and customary distributors' or sellers' commis-
sion." Id.
One noted authority has commented that § 2(11) "makes an 'underwriter' out of any-
one" who has purchased a security from the issuer or one in control of the issuer with a
view toward the security's distribution "whether or not he owns a pair of striped trou-
sers." L. Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 93 (1983).
4. See Greene, Determining the Responsibilities of Underwriters Distributing Securi-
ties Within an Integrated Disclosure System, 56 Notre Dame Law. 755, 760, 761-62
(1981) (underwriters conduct investigation of the issuer, control preparation of registra-
tion statement, determine timing of public offering, and underwrite offering) [hereinafter
cited as Greene, Responsibilities of Underwriters]; Wolfson, Investment Banking, in Abuse
on Wall Street: Conflicts of Interest in the Securities Markets 365, 365 (1980) ("A critical
element in the capital-raising process is the role of the investment banker-or under-
writer. ... "). For a discussion of the duties of a managing underwriter, see infra notes
31, 32 and accompanying text.
5. See, e.g., Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 619 F.2d 1222, 1224 (7th Cir. 1980),
cert denied, 450 U.S. 1005 (1981); In re Itel Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 104, 107 (N.D. Cal.
1981); In re Gap Stores Sec. Litig., 79 F.R.D. 283, 288 (N.D. Cal. 1978); DiJulio v.
Digicon, Inc., 339 F. Supp. 1284, 1285 (D. Md. 1972); Benzoni v. Greve, 54 F.R.D. 450,
452 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); see also E. Folk, Developments in Securities Regulation 1975 18
("In recent years underwriters have joined the ranks of those sued by dissatisfied inves-
tors in public offerings.") [hereinafter cited as Folk I].
6. See infra notes 62-65, 124, 125 and accompanying text.
7. Managing underwriters are also referred to as "lead underwriters," "syndicate
managers," "originating bankers," and "syndicate representatives." These terms will be
used interchangeably in this Note.
8. See Klein v. Computer Devices, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 837, 840 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); In
re Itel See. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 104, 121 (N.D. Cal. 1981). Two reasons for the limit on
underwriters' liability are the limit on damages imposed by § 11 (e) of the Act, see infra
Pt. II.A.l., and the privity requirement of § 12(2) of the Act, see infra Pt. II.A.2, yet
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This Note argues that managing underwriters' liability should extend
to all securities sold in an offering. Part I provides a brief overview of the
underwriting process. Part II discusses how the Act's express civil pen-
alties may be applied to managing underwriters and concludes that they
should be subject to expanded liability under section 12(2). It also looks
briefly at methods by which lead underwriters can spread this risk among
other underwriters in the syndicate.
I. BACKGROUND
A securities offering may be underwritten9 on either a "best efforts" or
"firm commitment" basis.1" In a best efforts underwriting,"1 the under-
writer or underwriting group does not actually purchase the securities
but acts as broker or agent for the issuer.1 2 The underwriters assume no
risk: They agree only to use best efforts to offer and sell the securities,' 3
and they receive a commission on these sales. 4 The firm commitment is
a far more common method of underwriting." In this arrangement un-
managing underwriters have also escaped liability due to the statute of limitations, see
Turner v. First Wisconsin Mortgage Trust, 454 F. Supp. 899, 906-07 (E.D. Wis. 1978),
findings that the communication in question was not defective, see DiJulio v. Digicon,
Inc., 339 F. Supp. 1284, 1290 (D. Md. 1972), and settlement, see Munsey Trust v. Sycor,
Inc., 457 F. Supp. 924, 926 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
9. Securities may also be offered and sold in a direct offering by the issuer. R. Jen-
nings & H. Marsh, Securities Regulation 15-16 (5th ed. 1982). Obviously the liability of
underwriters is not a question in such cases.
10. R. Jennings & H. Marsh, supra note 9, at 17; L. Loss, supra note 3, at 83-90;
Greene, Responsibilities of Underwriters, supra note 4, at 762; Wolfson, supra note 4, at
418 n.1.
Strict or "old-fashioned" underwriting is a third method in which underwriters agree
to act as agents for the issuer in reselling securities but underwrite only those securities
not bought by the public. This arrangement is rarely used except in "rights offerings,"
which are offerings to existing security owners by means of warrants or rights. See R.
Jennings & H. Marsh, supra note 9, at 17; L. Loss, supra note 3, at 82-83.
11. A best efforts "underwriting" is technically not an underwriting at all because the
investment banking firm does not buy the securities from the issuer. R. Jennings & H.
Marsh, supra note 9, at 17; L. Loss, supra note 3, at 90; Greene, Responsibilities of Under-
writers, supra note 4, at 762 n.35. This arrangement, however, is subsumed within the
definition of "underwriter" provided by § 2(11) of the Act, which includes one who "of-
fers or sells for an issuer." 15 U.S.C. § 77b(l 1) (1982); see Greene, Responsibilities of
Underwriters, supra note 4, at 762 n.35.
12. See supra note 11. The term "issuer" is defined, with certain qualifications and
exceptions, as "every person who issues or proposes to issue any security." Securities Act
of 1933, § 2(4), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(4) (1982).
13. See R. Jennings & H. Marsh, supra note 9, at 17; L. Loss, supra note 3, at 90;
Greene, Responsibilities of Underwriters, supra note 4, at 762; Wolfson, supra note 4, at
418 n. 1. Best efforts arrangements are used primarily when an issuer is not well known
and no underwriter wants to make a stronger commitment, or when an established issuer
attempts to save money on distribution costs. L. Loss, supra note 3, at 90.
14. See L. Loss, supra note 3, at 90; Wolfson, supra note 4, at 418 n. 1.
15. R. Jennings & H. Marsh, supra note 9, at 17; L. Loss, supra note 3, at 83-84;
Halleran & Calderwood, Effect of Federal Regulation on Distribution of and Trading in
Securities, 28 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 86, 88 nAb (1959); Wolfson, supra note 4, at 418 n.1.
In 1980, approximately $47.8 billion in securities were underwritten on a firm commit-
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derwriters purchase securities outright from the issuer,16 thereby assum-
ing the risk that the securities might not sell.' 7
There are also several ways for an issuer to select an underwriter."8 In
a competitive bidding, two or more underwriting groups submit sealed
bids and the highest bidding group gets the deal.19 More frequently,20 an
issuer negotiates an underwriting agreement by approaching one or more
investment bankers with whom it has had previous dealings2t or whose
reputations are respected.22
Most offerings are handled by syndicates, rather than by single under-
writers.23 This arrangement allows underwriters to spread the risks in-
volved.2 4  Traditionally one25 investment banking house acts as the
syndicate's "lead" or "managing" underwriter.26 In a competitively bid
underwriting, each group chooses its leader prior to the bidding.27 When
ment basis, compared with S4.6 billion sold on a best efforts basis and S6.5 billion sold
directly by the issuer. Greene, Responsibilities of Underwriters, supra note 4, at 762 (cit-
ing 40 SEC Monthly Statistical Review 28 (Feb. 1981)).
16. R. Jennings & H. Marsh, supra note 9, at 17; see Greene, Responsibilities of Un-
derwriters, supra note 4, at 762; Wolfson, supra note 4, at 418 n.l.
17. See Wolfson, supra note 4, at 418 n.l. A more likely risk is that the securities
will sell at a price lower than the public offering price. See Greene, Responsibilities of
Underwriters, supra note 4, at 762 & n.34. The underwriter's commitment is generally
subject to a "market out" provision, allowing the underwriter to back out if market con-
ditions change radically prior to the effective date of the registration statement. R. Jen-
nings & H. Marsh, supra note 9, at 17; Tyler, More About Blue Sky, 39 Wash. & Lee L
Rev. 899, 918 & n.18 (1982).
18. One method of selecting an underwriter that will not be discussed in detail is the
"Dutch auction," in which each underwriter submits a bid only for the amount of securi-
ties it intends to purchase. This arrangement is rarely used. See generally L Jennings &
H. Marsh, supra note 9, at 15-16 (Dutch auction and its use by Exxon Corp.); L Loss,
supra note 3, at 89 n.6 (same); Greene, Responsibilities of Underwriters, supra note 4, at
792-93 (same).
19. L. Loss, supra note 3, at 89-90. Competitive bidding is used for the sale of munic-
ipal and state securities and is required in many regulated industries. Wolfson, supra note
4, at 370; see L. Loss, supra note 3, at 89 & n.6; Greene, Responsibilities of Underwriters,
supra note 4, at 763 & n.44, 791; Halleran & Calderwood, supra note 15, at 103.
20. See Greene, Responsibilities of Underwriters, supra note 4, at 792 & n.231 ("com-
petitive bidding is not a widespread practice"); see also Halleran & Calderwood, supra
note 15, at 103, 104 (there has been "enormous growth" in amount of securities sold by
competitive bidding, but few issuers choose this method unless required to).
21. L. Loss, supra note 3, at 84; see Greene, Responsibilities of Underwriters, supra
note 4, at 762-63; Wolfson, supra note 4, at 367, 418 n.1.
22. L. Loss, supra note 3, at 84. In the case of a first public offering, an issuer might
seek a firm that specializes in new issues. Wolfson, supra note 4, at 418 n.1.
23. This is especially true with larger issues. See L Jennings & H. Marsh, supra note
9, at 17; see also L. Loss, supra note 3, at 84-85 (history and development of syndicates).
For the structure of underwriting syndicates, see R. Jennings & H. Marsh, supra note 9,
at 18-19.
24. L. Loss, supra note 3, at 84, 85; Greene, Responsibilities of Underwriters, supra
note 4, at 762; Wolfson, supra note 4, at 418 n. 1. See infra notes 160, 161 and accompa-
nying text.
25. In many offerings there is more than one managing underwriter. IL Jennings &
H. Marsh, supra note 9, at 19; L. Loss, supra note 3, at 86.
26. See L Jennings & H. Marsh, supra note 9, at 17; L. Loss, supra note 3, at 85, 86.
27. See L. Loss, supra note 3, at 89-90.
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the negotiated method is used, the investment banking firm that is first
approached by the issuer usually gets this position.28
The managing underwriter title brings added responsibility and an ex-
tra fee,29 both of which are described in an "Agreement Among Under-
writers.",30 The most significant duty3 for purposes of this Note is the
lead underwriter's investigation of the issuer's financial strength and fu-
ture earnings potential.32 This study is used to determine both the price
of the securities 33 and whether the prospectus is complete and not mate-
rially misleading under the Securities Act.34 Of course, nothing in the
28. See R. Jennings & H. Marsh, supra note 9, at 17; L. Loss, supra note 3, at 83;
Greene, Responsibilities of Underwriters, supra note 4, at 763.
29. See R. Jennings & H. Marsh, supra note 9, at 17, 20-21; L. Loss, supra note 3, at
88; Greene, Responsibilities of Underwriters, supra note 4, at 763; Halleran & Calder-
wood, supra note 15, at 101. The fee of each participant in the offering process is deter-
mined by the "gross spread"-the difference between the price paid to the issuer and the
public offering price. For example, if the gross spread is one dollar per share, the lead
underwriter might receive 20 cents per share on every share sold. R. Jennings & H.
Marsh, supra note 9, at 20-21. In other words, the lead underwriter receives a fee on the
shares sold by other underwriters. As for the rest of the dollar, 30 cents might represent
the "gross underwriting fee," which is compensation to the syndicate for expenses, use of
capital and assumption of the underwriting risk, and 50 cents would go to the firm that
actually sold the share. Id. at 21.
30. The "Agreement Among Underwriters" should be distinguished from what is
generally called the "Underwriting Agreement." The former contract involves only the
syndicate and usually contains, inter alia, the following provisions: payment and security
delivery terms; designation of the managing underwriters and the scope of their author-
ity; indemnification arrangements among syndicate members; trading restrictions; and
termination date of the offering. Greene, Responsibilities of Underwriters, supra note 4, at
763 & n.39; see R. Jennings & H. Marsh, supra note 9, at 18; L. Loss, supra note 3, at 86.
The "Underwriting Agreement," on the other hand, is signed by the issuer and the lead
underwriter acting on behalf of the participating underwriters, who thereby become par-
ties to the contract. R. Jennings & H. Marsh, supra note 9, at 18. For the terms of this
agreement, see Greene, Responsibilities of Underwriters, supra note 4, at 763.
3 1. Other duties of the lead underwriter include organizing the syndicate and notify-
ing each underwriter of how much of the security it can retain for sale and how much
goes into a "pot" to be distributed to retailers. See R. Jennings & H. Marsh, supra note 9,
at 17, 18, 20. The lead underwriter will also manage or settle any litigation that arises
from the offering. See In re Gap Stores Sec. Litig., 79 F.R.D. 283, 289, 290 n.4 (N.D.
Cal. 1978).
32. See Greene, Responsibilities of Underwriters, supra note 4, at 764 (detailed investi-
gation is expected and is usually performed by the managing underwriter, issuer and
counsel). In practice, the "bulk of the investigation" may be conducted by the under-
writer's law firm. Wolfson, supra note 4, at 375. Yet the lead underwriter is ultimately
responsible for assuring the scope and accuracy of this investigation and its correct sum-
mary in the prospectus. See Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 696, 697
(S.D.N.Y. 1968) (underwriters are as responsible for the truth of the prospectus as are
issuers).
33. See Folk, Civil Liabilities Under the Federal Securities Acts: The BarChris Case
(Part I), 55 Va. L. Rev. 1, 55 (1969) (underwriter who investigates plays an often decisive
role in pricing the offering) [hereinafter cited as Folk II]. Price is also determined by
other factors, such as market conditions, price earnings multiples of companies compara-
ble to the issuer, and a fair amount of intuition on the part of the investment banker.
Wolfson, supra note 4, at 382-85.
34. Schedules A and B of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77aa (1982), provide a de-
tailed list of information required in the registration statement, which includes and ex-
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agreement among underwriters prevents other underwriters in the syndi-
cate from conducting their own investigations of the issuer.35 A syndi-
cate may include more than 100 underwriters,36 however, and it is
unlikely that each will conduct its own thorough investigation.37 In fact,
it is "standard operating procedure in the investment banking indus-
try"38 for all the underwriters in a syndicate to rely on the lead under-
writer's investigation.39
This reliance calls into question the way in which the courts have ap-
portioned liability. If an issue turns sour,' the managing underwriter
pands upon the information required in a prospectus, see 15 U.S.C. § 77j (1982). Section
11 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1982), adds the requirement that no false or misleading
statements appear in the registration statement, and § 12(2) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 771(2)
(1982), makes the same true for prospectuses. See Folk II, supra note 33, at 55, 56-57
(investigation used to ensure accuracy of registration statement and satisfy requirements
of Securities Act).
The investigation may also be a means for the underwriter to determine whether a
public offering is appropriate for the firm in question. Greene, Responsibilities of Under-
writers, supra note 4, at 764; see, e.g. Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643,
693 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (purpose of preliminary investigation was to determine whether un-
derwriter should undertake financing).
35. For the terms of the agreement, see supra note 30.
36. See, e.g., In re Itel Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 104, 111 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (one offering
involved 104 underwriters; another included 114); McFarland v. Memorex Corp., 493 F.
Supp. 631, 634 n.4 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (offering made by 103 underwriters); Benzoni v.
Greve, 54 F.R.D. 450, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (syndicate included 133 underwriters); see
also R. Jennings & H. Marsh, supra note 9, at 19 (approximately 10 to 100 firms partici-
pate in any given offering); L. Loss, supra note 3, at 83 (trend is toward larger syndicates,
sometimes well over 100 firms); Wolfson, supra note 4, at 418 n.1 (syndicates range from
a handful to over 100 firms).
37. See Folk II, supra note 33, at 56-57. The author states that "chaos would prevail
if each underwriter participated in the investigation and tried to verify the accuracy of the
registration statement" because the underwriters would spend all their time on these ac-
tivities instead of marketing the securities. L at 57. Another commentator also believes
that an independent investigation by each underwriter would be impractical. See Wolf-
son, supra note 4, at 374. However, that author implies that participating underwriters
should at least take steps to determine whether the lead underwriter has done a responsi-
ble job in its investigation. See id. at 375. The Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) has suggested that a participating underwriter need not actually verify the infor-
mation in a registration statement but must "'satisfy himself that the managing under-
writer makes the kind of investigation the participant would have performed if he were
the manager.'" In re Gap Stores Sec. Litig., 79 F.R.D. 283, 301 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (quot-
ing SEC Act of 1933 Rel. No. 5275, at 11-12 (July 26, 1972)); see also Gap Stores, 79
F.R.D. at 300-02 (discussing relative responsibilities of participating and managing un-
derwriters for purposes of section 11 class action); L. Loss, supra note 3, at 1037 (it is
unclear how much participants may rely on lead underwriter). See infra text accompany-
ing note 51.
38. Wolfson, supra note 4, at 374.
39. Id.; see Escott v. BarCliris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 692 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)
(participating underwriters made no investigation of the accuracy of the prospectus);
Folk I, supra note 5, at 19 (participating underwriters take a relatively passive, back-
ground position); Greene, Responsibilities of Undervriters, supra note 4, at 778 (partici-
pating underwriter merely ascertains that reliance on manager is reasonable); Wolfson,
supra note 4, at 374-75 (participating underwriters do not even check on lead under-
writer's investigation).
40. This does not necessarily mean that the issuer has filed for bankruptcy, although
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has traditionally been under no potential liability to those who were not
its direct customersa-in other words, most of the investors.42 There is
not even a chance of indirect liability, as the agreement among under-
writers usually precludes indemnification by the lead underwriter.43
Consider this problem in practice:' Corporation C makes its initial
public offering of securities. Forty underwriters handle the offering on a
firm commitment basis, but lead underwriter U is the only one to check
C's finances and future prospects.45 U concludes that C is a high risk
business but still a good investment gamble for the syndicate. However,
U does not object when C's attorneys prepare a prospectus that is more
optimistic than C's finances warrant. A number of investors purchase
C's securities, relying in part on the good name of underwriter U,46 and
are shocked when C files for bankruptcy within a year. Because suing C
will probably not produce a sufficient recovery,4 7 investors will look to
the underwriters as potential "deep pockets. ' 48  Yet if an investor
prevails in a suit against the underwriter from whom he bought, the re-
covery will come from a firm whose involvement in preparing the pro-
spectus was minimal. 49 Lead underwriter U, which could have corrected
this is often the case. See, e.g., Klein v. Computer Devices, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 270, 272
n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), modified on rehearing, 602 F. Supp. 837 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Escott v.
BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 654 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). A stock issue may
also turn sour, at least from the points of view of shareholders, if the market price drops
substantially. See, eg., In re Gap Stores See. Litig., 79 F.R.D. 283, 288-89 (N.D. Cal.
1978) (price dropped from $18 to $8 per share over a three month period).
41. See infra notes 62-65, 124, 125 and accompanying text.
42. If a syndicate consists of a large number of underwriters, see supra note 36 and
accompanying text, it is likely that a high percentage of sales will be made by members
other than the lead underwriter. See Brodsky, Corporate and Securities Litigation: Un-
derwriters'Liability Under Section 12(2), N.Y.L.J., Sept. 5, 1984, at 1, col. 1 (lead under-
writer "may only have sold a small proportion of the securities" in an offering).
43. The agreement usually provides for several, but not joint, liability. See infra note
161 and accompanying text. This provision is included in order to limit liability under
§ 11 (e) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1982). See infra notes 60-65 and accompanying
text.
44. The scenario described is similar to the facts in Klein v. Computer Devices, Inc.,
591 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), modified on rehearing, 602 F. Supp. 837 (S.D.N.Y.
1985).
45. See supra notes 38, 39 and accompanying text.
46. See infra notes 133-35 and accompanying text.
47. Recovery from the issuer is likely to be limited because it is in bankruptcy pro-
ceedings and its assets, which may be insubstantial to begin with, must be divided among
a number of creditors. See 11 U.S.C. § 507 (1982) (priority of creditors). Moreover, any
action against the issuer will be stayed under a provision of the Bankruptcy Act, id.
§ 362(c), until bankruptcy proceedings are completed. See Klein v. Computer Devices,
Inc., 591 F. Supp. 270, 272 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), modified on rehearing, 602 F. Supp. 837
(S.D.N.Y. 1985). As for the officers and directors of the issuer, their fortunes may be tied
to the fate of the issuer, and their funds might be depleted quickly if a large number of
investors were to recover.
48. Greene, Why Underwriters Are Nervous, Forbes, Sept. 12, 1983, at 164 (hereinaf-
ter cited as Greene, Underwriters Nervous].
49. See Wolfson, supra note 4, at 374. See supra notes 38, 39 and accompanying text.
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the prospectus, has escaped liability except to its immediate customers."
Although it would be imprudent to allow the other underwriters to
escape liability altogether,5 some expansion of lead underwriters' liabil-
ity is required. The current state of the law is somewhat unfair to the
other underwriters because they are less responsible for the prospectus
than the manager is;52 on the other hand, they have entered into the
arrangement voluntarily. More important, the present law works to the
disadvantage of investors. A change in the apportionment of liability
will encourage managing underwriters to take the utmost care in their
investigation of issuers.53 In the scenario described above, U might have
hesitated before giving its endorsement of C if U's potential liability were
greater. A change here will also ease procedural burdens on purchasers
of securities, as a plaintiff class will be able to sue one defendant rather
than dozens.' The Securities Act provides several possible avenues for
such a change in liability.
II. EXPANDING THE LIABILITY OF UNDERWRITERS
A. Express Civil Liabilities Under the Securities Act
The Securities Act is primarily a disclosure statute," focusing on the
50. See supra note 8, infra notes 62-65, 124, 125 and accompanying text.
51. See supra note 37.
52. See supra notes 38, 39 and accompanying text and supra note 49.
53. The premise of the Securities Act as a whole was that increasing the potential
liability of actors in the ofering process would make them more careful in their represen-
tations to the public. See infra notes 99-105 and accompanying text.
54. Plaintiff investors often get class certification for themselves, see, ,'g., Collins v.
Signetics Corp., 605 F.2d 110, 112 (3d Cir. 1979); In re Itel See. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 104,
107 (N.D. Cal. 1981), but may have trouble getting the defendant underwriters certified
as a class, see, e.g., In re Gap Stores See. Litig., 79 F.R.D 283, 307 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (class
certification for defendant underwriters denied with respect to § 12(2) claims). If the
managing underwriter could be sued alone, plaintiffs would have to prepare a case against
only one defendant. This would reduce litigation expenses considerably.
55. See infra notes 99-105 and accompanying text. Some state Blue Sky laws are
"merit" statutes-that is, a state agency has the power to disapprove issues which, in the
agency's opinion, lack merit. See, e.g., Cal. Corp. Code § 25140 (West 1977); Mo. Ann.
Stat. § 409.306 (Vernon 1979); see also Tyler, supra note 17, at 901-04 (evaluating merit
provisions of Uniform Securities Act). The Securities Act does not serve this function,
and most of those involved in its enactment did not intend it to do so. One of Franklin D.
Roosevelt's first actions in office was to send a message to Congress calling for federal
securities legislation. In this message he stated: "Of course, the Federal Government
cannot and should not take any action which might be construed as approving or guaran-
teeing that newly issued securities are sound in the sense that their value will be main-
tained or that the properties which they represent will earn profit." 77 Cong. Rec. 937
(1933) [hereinafter cited as President's Message], reprinted in I J. Ellenberger & E. Ma-
har, Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of
1934, at Item 3 (1973). One member of the House of Representatives stated that the bill
would not "prevent anybody from putting his money into rat holes or into highly specu-
lative ventures if he sees fit to do so." 77 Cong. Rec. 2912 (1933) (remarks of Rep. Ma-
pes), reprinted in 1 J. Ellenberger & E. Mahar, supra, at Item 7. There was, however,
some debate on the issue. See L. Loss, supra note 3, at 32-38.
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need for potential investors to acquire information about issuers. 56 In
accordance with this goal, the Act contains several sections that provide
for express5" civil liabilities when disclosure standards are not met. 8
When the lead underwriter is responsible for failing to disclose fully or
properly, investors may look to sections 11 and 12(2) of the Act.5 9
1. Section 11
Section 11 explicitly makes underwriters' liable for material misstate-
ments or omissions in a registration statement. 61 At first glance this sec-
tion seems the logical one to use in a suit against an underwriter.
However, a 1934 amendment-section 1 l(e)-contains a provision that
limits an underwriter's liability to the total price of the securities it un-
derwrites.62 A qualifier to the section provides that an underwriter's lia-
56. See 77 Cong. Rec. 2912, 2914, 2919 (1933) (remarks of Reps. Mapes, Greenwood,
Rayburn), reprinted in 1 J. Ellenberger & E. Mahar, supra note 55, at Item 7; see also
Greene, Responsibilities of Underwriters, supra note 4, at 756 (basic requirement of Act is
disclosure of issuers' financial affairs); Halleran & Calderwood, supra note 15, at 94 (pur-
pose of Act was disclosure of all pertinent information; prior to Act even reputable firms
issued securities on basis of "rather sketchy information"). See infra notes 99-105 and
accompanying text. Professor Loss notes that "there is the recurrent theme throughout
[federal securities laws] of disclosure, again disclosure, and still more disclosure." L.
Loss, supra note 3, at 7.
57. The Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act), ch.
404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§78a-kk (1982)), have been inter-
preted as implying civil liabilities as well as providing express remedies. See, for example,
§ 10(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C § 78j(b) (1982). See Harmsen v. Smith, 693 F.2d
932, 938 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 89 (1983); see also Lowenfels, Recent
Supreme Court Decisions Under the Federal Securities Laws: The Pendulum Swings, 65
Geo. L.J. 891, 892-900 (1977) (implied rights of action under § 10(b) of the Exchange
Act); Steinberg, The Propriety and Scope of Cumulative Remedies Under the Federal Se-
curities Laws, 67 Cornell L. Rev. 557, 560-71 (1982) (Supreme Court's approach to im-
plied remedies).
58. See Securities Act of 1933, §§ 11, 12, 15, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 1, o (1982).
59. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 1(2) (1982).
60. Underwriters are not the only potential defendants under § 11. It also subjects to
liability every person who signed the registration statement, directors of or partners in the
issuer, those named in the registration statement as being or about to be named directors
or partners, and certain experts whose reports are used in the registration statement. See
15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1982).
61. Section l1(a) provides in pertinent part:
In case any part of the registration statement, when such part became effective,
contained an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material
fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein
not misleading, any person acquiring such security (unless it is proved that at
the time of such acquisition he knew of such untruth or omission) may, either at
law or in equity, in any court of competent jurisdiction, sue- . (5) every
underwriter with respect to such security.
Id.; see H. Bloomenthal, 1982 Securities Law Handbook §11.03[2], at 174-75; Greene,
Responsibilities of Underwriters, supra note 4, at 765-67.
62. "In no event shall any underwriter . . . be liable in any suit . . . authorized
under subsection (a) of this section for damages in excess of the total price at which the
securities underwritten by him and distributed to the public were offered to the public."
15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1982). Managing underwriters have avoided unlimited liability under
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bility is not limited if it has received an extra fee from the issuer.6 3
Managing underwriters do receive an extra fee," but they have "rou-
tinely evaded" unlimited liability by arranging for the syndicate rather
than the issuer to pay this fee.65
Although not entirely clear from the legislative history, it is likely that
Congress intended section 1 l(e) to increase the potential liability of man-
aging underwriters.66 A memorandum to the Senate explaining the
amendment stated: "lilt provides that an underwriter who does not re-
ceive any preferential treatment is permitted to limit his total liability."
67
Whom could Congress have had in mind as receiving preferential treat-
ment if not the lead underwriter? Not only does it take in an extra fee
from securities sold by the other underwriters, 68 it benefits from the pres-
tige associated with the managing underwriter title.69 Yet managing un-
derwriters have thus far been successful in evading liability under section
11,70 and expansion of their liability in this area is unlikely without a
mandate from Congress.
this provision by arranging for the whole syndicate to purchase securities from the issuer
in a firm commitment underwriting. See Halleran & Calderwood, supra note 15, at 98-
99. Before the Securities Act was passed, the managing underwriter often made the en-
tire purchase and resold to syndicate members. See id. at 98.
63. An underwriter's liability is limited "unless such underwriter shall have know-
ingly received from the issuer for acting as an underwriter some benefit, directly or indi-
rectly, in which all other underwriters similarly situated did not share in proportion to
their respective interests in the underwriting." 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1982).
64. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
65. L. Loss, supra note 3, at 1039 n.67; see Greene, Responsibilities of Underwriters,
supra note 4, at 763 n.43.
66. The fact that a number of other amendments to the Securities Act were passed as
part of the same bill may explain the lack of legislative history on this point. See, eg., 15
U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1982) (definition of security); id § 77b(4) (definition of issuer); id.
§ 77b(10) (definition of prospectus); id § 77c(a)(2) (exemption for government issued se-
curities). There is little indication of legislative intent for the phrase concerning limits on
underwriters' liability. Yet the language itself points clearly to managing underwriters.
See id. § 77k(e). See supra note 63 and accompanying text. If managing underwriters fall
under an exception to a limit on liability, then Congress must have intended their liability
to be greater than other underwriters. But see Brodsky, supra note 42, at 2, cols. 1-2, who
makes the opposite argument in a discussion of Klein v. Computer Devices, Inc., 591 F.
Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), modified on rehearing, 602 F. Supp. 837 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
See infra notes 116-29 and accompanying text. He finds that the earlier Klein decision,
which suggested that a managing underwriter could be liable to other underwriters' cus-
tomers, was contrary to the intent of § 1 l(e). See Brodsky, supra note 42, at 2, col. 2.
Brodsky notes the exception for extra compensation by the issuer but does not suggest
what Congress' intent might have been in adding this provision. See id. The Klein court
appears to have agreed with Brodsky's interpretation in its second opinion. See Klein,
602 F. Supp. at 840.
67. 78 Cong. Rec. 8669 (1934) (statement of Sen. Fletcher) (emphasis added), re-
printed in 4 J. Ellenberger & E. Mahar, supra note 55, at Item 10.
68. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
69. See R. Jennings & H. Marsh, supra note 9, at 19.
70. See, e.g., In re Gap Stores Sec. Litig., 79 F.R.D. 283, 303 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (man-
aging underwriters' liability in section 11 case was limited to securities they underwrote).
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2. Section 12(2)
Section 12(2) 7' has no limit on liability and has a broader reach72 than
section 11. This section provides a civil remedy when a security is of-
fered or sold by means of a prospectus or oral communication 7 that
contains a material misstatement or omission.74 However, the language
71. Section 12 of the Securities Act contains another private remedy provision in
§ 12(1), 15 U.S.C. § 771(1) (1982), which provides a civil remedy to investors for viola-
tions of § 5 of the Act, id. § 77e. Section 5 makes it unlawful to use instruments of
interstate commerce to sell or transport unregistered securities. This section does not
relate to managing underwriters' liability because an unregistered offering usually does
not involve underwriters, but §§ 12(1) and 12(2) share an apparent requirement of priv-
ity. See id. § 771(1). See infra note 77 and accompanying text. The tests for privity are
generally the same, see Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680,
692-93, 695 (5th Cir. 1971), but if there is any difference, it is that an even broader
construction-a looser privity standard-has sometimes been applied to § 12(2), Id. at
692; see also Davis v. Avco Fin. Servs., Inc., 739 F.2d 1057, 1064 n.2 (6th Cir. 1984)
(suggesting but not expressing an opinion on this difference), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1359
(1985).
72. "Section 12(2) is the broadest of the Act's civil liability provisions .... "
Schneider, Section 12 of the Securities Act of 1933: The Privity Requirement in the Con-
temporary Securities Law Perspective, 51 Tenn. L. Rev. 235, 236 (1984); see L. Loss, supra
note 3, at 1021-22; Schneider, supra, at 236 n.7. Section 12(2) reaches securities exempt
from registration requirements under §§ 3 and 4 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c, d (1982).
See id. § 771(2); Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680, 695
(5th Cir. 1971); Kaminsky, An Analysis of Securities Litigation Under Section 12(2) and
How It Compares with Rule lOb-5, 13 Hous. L. Rev. 231, 236 (1976). It specifically
excludes, however, securities exempt under § 3(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2) (1982) (gov-
ernment-sold securities). See id. § 771(2); Kaminsky, supra, at 236. For another area in
which § 12 is broader than § 11, see infra note 73.
73. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1982). This is also broader than § 11, which only reaches
misstatements or omissions in registration statements filed with the SEC pursuant to § 6,
id. § 77f. See id. § 77k. A prospectus may include a circular, advertisement, letter or
communication that is written or delivered by radio or television. Id. § 77b(10). The
inclusion of the term "oral communication" in § 12(2) extends its reach still further. Id.
§ 771(2).
74. Section 12(2) provides in part that any person who
offers or sells a security. . . by the use of any means or instruments of trans-
portation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails, by means of
a prospectus or oral communication, which includes an untrue statement of a
material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading. . . shall be liable to the person purchasing such security from him
15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1982).
The elements of a cause of action under § 12(2) are the purchase of a security, use of
the jurisdictional means in connection with the sale of the security, and use of a prospec-
tus or oral communication that contains a false or misleading statement or omission. See
Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680, 695 (5th Cir. 1971); In
re Itel Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 104, 115 (N.D. Cal. 1981); Bloomenthal, supra note 61,
§ 11.05, at 182-83; Kaminsky, supra note 72, at 253.
Section 12(2) does not require a plaintiff to prove reliance on the prospectus or commu-
nication. See, e.g., Davis v. Avco Fin. Servs., Inc., 739 F.2d 1057, 1068 (6th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1359 (1985); Junker v. Crory, 650 F.2d 1349, 1359 (5th Cir. 1981);
Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 619 F.2d 1222, 1225 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 1005 (1981); Hill York, 448 F.2d at 695; Gilbert v. Nixon, 429 F.2d 348, 356-57
THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933
of section 12(2) appears to demand a showing of privity between plaintiff
and defendant." This requirement is the primary impediment to suits
against managing underwriters.76
Section 12(2) clearly states that a defendant may be liable only to "the
person purchasing [a] security from him."" Many courts have side-
stepped this privity requirement, however, by expanding the definition of
"seller"'78 or by using secondary liability theories.7 9  For instance,
(10th Cir. 1970); Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 422 F.2d 1124, 1129-30 (4th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 916 (1974); Bloomenthal, supra note 61, §11.05, at 183; Kaminsky,
supra note 72, at 264-66; Schneider, supra note 72, at 237 & n.9. Nor need plaintiff show
scienter on the part of defendant. Davis, 739 F.2d at 1068; Junker, 650 F.2d at 1359; Hill
York, 448 F.2d at 695; Kaminsky, supra note 72, at 233 & n.18; Schneider, supra note 72,
at 237 & n.10; Note, Seller Liability Under Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933: A
Proximate Cause-Substantial Factor Approach Limited by a Duty of Inquiry, 36 Vand. L
Rev. 361, 363 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Seller Liability].
A number of defenses are available, most notably the due care defense: that defendant
did not know and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known of the untruth
or omission. See Davis, 739 F.2d at 1068; Itel, 89 F.R.D. at 115; Lorber v. Beebe, 407 F.
Supp. 279, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Bloomenthal, supra note 61, § 11.05, at 183; Kaminsky,
supra note 72, at 236-37, 275-78; Rapp, Expanded Liability Under Section 12 of the Se-
curities Ac When Is a Seller Not a Seller?, 27 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 445, 447 n. 11
(1977); Schneider, supra note 72, at 237 & n. 11. Other possible defenses are the short
statute of limitations, under which an action generally must be brought within one year of
discovery of the misrepresentation, see 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1982); Rapp, supra, at 447 n.11;
Schneider, supra note 72, at 237 n. 12, waiver and estoppel, see Kaminsky, supra note 72,
at 278-80, and in pan delicto (unclean hands), see Can-Am Petroleum Co. v. Beck, 331
F.2d 371, 373-74 (10th Cir. 1964) (investor did not have degree of culpability to be in pani
delicto); Peterson, Recent Developments in Civil Liability Under Section 12(2) of the Se-
curities Act of 1933, 5 Hous. L. Rev. 274, 287-88 (1967) (ramifications of Can-Am deci-
sion); Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Caser Aiding and Abetting,
Conspiracy, In Pan Delicto, Indemnification, and Contribution, 120 U. Pa. L Rev. 597,
659-664 (1972) (use of in pari delicto defense in other areas of securities law).
Section 12(2) is based on common law rescission, but plaintiffs may ask for either re-
scission or damages. See Kaminsky, supra note 72, at 233 n.15; Rapp, supra, at 446;
Schneider, supra note 72, at 236 n.4.
75. See infra note 77 and accompanying text.
76. See Schneider, supra note 72, at 237 (the privity requirement is the "most signifi-
cant limitation" of section 12(2)).
77. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1982) (emphasis added).
78. See SEC v. Seaboard Corp. (Seaboard I), 677 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1982)
("The meaning of 'seller' for purposes of § 12 has been judicially expanded beyond the
person who tranfers title. . . ."); Pharo v. Smith, 621 F.2d 656, 665 (5th Cir. 1980) (the
"definition of seller has broadened slowly and cautiously"); Hill York Corp. v. American
Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680, 692 (5th Cir. 1971) ("It is clear that a seller is not
required to be the person who passes title."); see also Schneider, supra note 72, at 238
("[N]umerous courts have held that a statutory seller need not be the actual transferor of
title."). The court in Seaboard Corp. noted that a broad reading of "seller" may be in
doubt due to recent Supreme Court cases. See 677 F.2d at 1294 n.4.
"Seller" theories include proximate causation, see infra note 85 and accompanying
text, significant participation and substantial factor tests, see infra notes 86-88 and ac-
companying text, and solicitation, see infra note 89. Section 2(3) of the Securities Act, 15
U.S.C. § 7T(3) (1982), provides definitions of "sale" and "sell" but not "seller."
79. Secondary liability theories include control relationships under § 15 of the Act,
see infra note 89, and aiding and abetting or conspiracy, see infra notes 83, 84 and accom-
panying text. For a discussion of secondary liability theories, see Rapp, supra note 74, at
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agents,80 accountants,81 and attorneys 2 have all been found liable under
section 12(2) even though they may not have actually sold the securities.
Plaintiffs may charge a defendant with "aiding and abetting" or "con-
spiring with" other defendants in the preparation of an issuer's mislead-
ing prospectus. Courts have skirted the privity requirement by finding
civil liability for aiding and abetting a section 12(2) violation when de-
fendants knew of and substantially assisted in the violation. 3 The re-
quirement of scienter, however, may make it difficult for a plaintiff to
481-501; Comment, Attorneys and Participant Liability Under §12(2) of the Securities Act
of 1933, 1982 Ariz. St. L.J. 529, 531 n.8 [hereinafter cited as Participant Liability]; Seller
Liability, supra note 74, at 377-81.
80. See SEC v. Seaboard Corp. (Seaboard I), 677 F.2d 1289, 1294-95 (9th Cir. 1982)
(agent may be a "seller" under § 12(2) if participation in transaction is extensive); Len-
nerth v. Mendenhall, 234 F. Supp. 59, 65 (N.D. Ohio 1964) (agent's activity was tanta-
mount to that of a seller).
81. See Sandusky Land, Ltd. v. Uniplan Groups, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 440, 444 (N.D.
Ohio 1975) (accounting firm may be liable if aiding and abetting is established); Kamin-
sky, supra note 72, at 248 & n.89 (accountants may be liable if they directly aided and
abetted the wrong); Schneider, supra note 72, at 238 & n.16 (accountants have been
charged with § 12(2) violations despite lack of privity with buyer).
82. See, e.g., Junker v. Crory, 650 F.2d 1349, 1360 (5th Cir. 1981) (attorney's active
participation made him a seller); In re Home-Stake Prod. Co. Sec. Litig., 76 F.R.D. 337,
349 (N.D. Okla. 1975) (attorneys may be liable if participation is significant); see Kamin-
sky, supra note 72, at 248 & n.87 (lawyers liable when they have aided and abetted the
wrong); Schneider, supra note 72, at 238 & n.15 (attorneys have been charged with
§ 12(2) violations despite lack of privity with buyer); Shipman, The Need for SEC Rules
to Govern the Duties and Civil Liabilities of Attorneys Under the Federal Securities Stat-
utes, 34 Ohio St. L.J. 231, 264-65 (1973) (liability of attorneys under Katz); Participant
Liability, supra note 79, at 532-50 (various theories under which attorneys may be liable);
Note, Corporate Attorney Who Actively Negotiated Merger Transaction Held a "Seller"
Within Scope of Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933-Junker v. Crory, 55 Temp.
L.Q. 528, 530-39, 548-53 (1982) (analyzing Junker decision); see also Croy v. Campbell,
624 F.2d 709, 714 (5th Cir. 1980) (attorneys may be liable but here proximate causation
was lacking); cf Katz v. Amos Treat & Co., 411 F.2d 1046, 1049, 1053 (2d Cir. 1969)
(attorney could be a seller for purposes of § 12(1)).
83. See, e.g., Monsen v. Consolidated Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793, 800.01 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 930 (1978); Lorber v. Beebe, 407 F. Supp. 279, 287-88
(S.D.N.Y. 1975); In re Caesars Palace Sec. Litig., 360 F. Supp. 366, 378-79 (S.D.N.Y.
1973).
The elements of an aiding and abetting cause of action were set out recently in Monsen,
579 F.2d at 799. Plaintiff must show an underlying securities violation, defendant's
knowledge of the violation, and defendant's knowing and substantial participation in the
act. See id.; cf Harmsen v. Smith, 693 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1982) (same elements for aiding
and abetting a violation of § 10(b) of Securities Exchange Act), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 89
(1983). See generally L. Loss, supra note 3, at 1187 (noting the incorporation of these
requirements into proposed Federal Securities Code); Rapp, supra note 74, at 482-99
(analyzing cases that use aiding and abetting theory); Ruder, supra note 74, at 620-28
(general discussion of aiding and abetting test); Schneider, supra note 72, at 244-47, 251-
59 (analyzing Caesars Palace and discussing Supreme Court view on aiding and abetting);
Participant Liability, supra note 79, at 563-65 (elements of aiding and abetting theory).
The conspiracy theory, which is closely related to aiding and abetting, is not used as
frequently. See Participant Liability, supra note 79, at 531 n.8; see also Ruder, supra note
74, at 638-41 (relevant questions for courts in a securities conspiracy charge and relation-
ship of conspiracy to aiding and abetting).
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prevail under this theory.8 4
Plaintiffs who are aware of this obstacle may also claim that a defend-
ant's role in the offering was the "proximate cause" of their injury; that
is, "but for" the actions of the defendant, plaintiffs would not have
purchased the securities."5 Finally, complaints may allege that a defend-
ant "significantly participated" and was a "substantial factor" in the of-
fering. 6 The participation and factor tests are the theories most
favorable to plaintiffs because they are not clearly defined87 and require
84. See Stokes v. Lokken, 644 F.2d 779, 783 (8th Cir. 1981) (scienter requirement not
met); deBruin v. Andromeda Broadcasting Sys., 465 F. Supp. 1276, 1280 (D. Nev. 1979)
(defendant had no direct knowledge nor could it be imputed to him); see also Monsen v.
Consolidated Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793, 799 (3d Cir.) ("Knowledge of the underly-
ing violation is a critical element in proof of aiding-abetting liability" but "the 'require-
ment of knowledge may be less strict where the alleged aider and abettor derives benefits
from the wrongdoing.' ") (quoting Gould v. American-Hawaiian Steamship Co., 535
F.2d 761, 780 (3d Cir. 1976)), cert denied, 439 U.S. 930 (1978). But see Seller Liability,
supra note 74, at 387 (aiding and abetting approach is more liberal in scope than other
theories).
85. See, eg., Davis v. Avco Fin. Servs., Inc., 739 F.2d 1057, 1065 (6th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 105 S. CL 1359 (1985); SEC v. Seaboard Corp. (Seaboard 1), 677 F.2d 1289,
1294 (9th Cir. 1982); Junker v. Crory, 650 F.2d 1349, 1360 (5th Cir. 1981); SEC v. Mur-
phy, 626 F.2d 633, 650 (9th Cir. 1980); Croy v. Campbell, 624 F.2d 709, 713 & n.5 (5th
Cir. 1980); Lewis v. Walston & Co., 487 F.2d 617, 621-22 (5th Cir. 1973); Somerville v.
Major Exploration, Inc., [1983-84 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 99,570, at
97,250 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 1983); cf Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc.,
448 F.2d 680, 693 (5th Cir. 1971) (in § 12(1) case, plaintiffs would not have bought secur-
ities without defendant promoters' actions).
An early case suggesting a proximate cause test was Lenerth v. Mendenhall, 234 F.
Supp. 59, 65 (N.D. Ohio 1964) ("The hunter who seduces the prey and leads it to the
trap he has set is no less guilty than the hunter whose hand springs the snare."). See
generally Kaminsky, supra note 72, at 248-50 (discussing Hill York and proximate causa-
tion test); Schneider, supra note 72, at 241-44, 259-63 (showing development of proximate
cause theory and discussing its legitimacy).
86. See Stokes v. Lokken, 644 F.2d 779, 785 (8th Cir. 1981) (section 12 liability lim-
ited to one in privity or one whose participation was a substantial factor in transaction);
Lawler v. Gilliam, 569 F.2d 1283, 1288 (4th Cir. 1978) (limited partners' activity was
substantial factor in transaction); Brick v. Dominion Mortgage & Realty Trust, 442 F.
Supp. 283, 306 (W.D.N.Y. 1977) (purchaser may have cause of action against one who
significantly participates in transaction); In re Home-Stake Prod. Co. Sec. Litig., 76
F.R.D. 337, 349 (N.D. Okla. 1975) (significant participation in sale may be sufficient for
§ 12(2) liability).
87. These theories do not have strong roots in criminal law, as aiding and abetting
does, see Schneider, supra note 72, at 244-45, or in tort theory, as proximate causation
does, see Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680, 693 (5th Cir.
1971) (quoting Lennerth v. Mendenhall, 234 F. Supp. 59, 65 (N.D. Ohio 1964)); see also
Schneider, supra note 72, at 238-39 (proximate cause and aiding and abetting are com-
mon law doctrines). But see Davis v. Avco Fin. Servs., Inc., 739 F.2d 1057, 1066-67 (6th
Cir. 1984) (substantial factor test also springs from tort law), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1359
(1985).
There is a good deal of overlap between the theories for avoiding the privity require-
ment, and apparent confusion among the courts concerning their use. For instance, the
participation and factor theories are often mixed with other tests or with each other. See,
e.g., SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633, 650 (9th Cir. 1980) (defendant must be substantial
factor in transaction in order to be proximate cause); Lawler v. Gilliam, 569 F.2d 1283,
1287-88 (4th Cir. 1978) (applying both tests as well as a solicitation approach); Lewis v.
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less involvement by the defendant."8
Most courts will choose one or a combination of these theories in "sat-
isfying" the privity requirement of section 12(2).89 Because such a result
seems contrary to the express language of the statute, the opinions are
often supplemented by a discussion of the broad remedial purposes of the
Securities Act.90
Walston & Co., 487 F.2d 617, 622 (5th Cir. 1973) (broker was a substantial factor so she
was proximate cause of transaction); see also Seller Liability, supra note 74, at 370-76
(discussing proximate cause and substantial factor tests as single approach).
Some courts feel that making distinctions among the theories discussed supra notes 83-
86, infra notes 88-89 and accompanying text is "nothing more than an exercise in seman-
tic hair-splitting" because all the tests indicate some degree of participation. In re
Caesars Palace Sec. Litig., 360 F. Supp. 366, 380 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). But see Davis, 739
F.2d at 1065 (theories present more than a semantic exercise; each case must be decided
on facts and the degree of participation may change result).
88. While the standard is more than de minimis participation, Katz v. David Katz &
Co., [1983-84 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 99,669, at 97,687 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 14, 1984), these tests do not seem to require the high degree of involvement that
other theories do. For instance, even if the defendant's participation is found to be active,
significant, or meaningful, see id., this does not necessarily mean that the defendant had
scienter, as required by the aiding and abetting theory. See supra note 84 and accompa-
nying text.
89. See, e.g., Davis v. Aveo Fin. Servs., Inc., 739 F.2d 1057, 1065 (6th Cir. 1984)
(loan company liable under proximate cause test), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1359 (1985);
Monsen v. Consolidated Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793, 802 (3d Cir.) (bank found to be
an aider and abettor), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 930 (1978); In re Home-Stake Prod. Co. Sec.
Litig., 76 F.R.D. 337, 349 (N.D. Okla. 1975) (attorneys liable due to their significant
participation in sales of securities); cf Lewis v. Walston & Co., 487 F.2d 617, 622 (5th
Cir. 1973) (combining substantial factor and proximate cause tests to find broker to be a
seller under § 12(1)).
A number of other theories that are less likely to be used against managing underwrit-
ers are available to plaintiffs in § 12(2) actions. Perhaps the simplest justification for
expanding liability is the "controlling persons" doctrine. Section 15 of the Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77o (1982), makes a person liable under §§ 11 or 12 if he controls another person or
entity that is liable under one of these sections. In other words, one may be liable under
§ 12(2) if the direct seller of securities is liable under this section and there is some kind
of control relationship between the seller and defendant. These elements may be difficult
to prove. See, e.g., duPont v. Wyly, 61 F.R.D. 615, 626 (D. Del. 1973) (control relation-
ship not properly alleged in complaint); Dorfman v. First Boston Corp., 336 F. Supp.
1089, 1092-93 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (no allegation of control). Even a court that does not
approve of the liberal trend regarding privity will accept this theory if the proper ele-
ments are present because it is based on a statutory exception rather than on a court-
contrived substitute for privity. See, e.g., Collins v. Signetics Corp., 605 F.2d 110, 111-
12, 113 (3d Cir. 1979). See generally Rapp, supra note 74, at 481-82 (discussing the
liability of controlling persons).
One of the earlier nonstatutory theories for expansion of liability was solicitation; that
is, a defendant should be liable if it solicited the sale even if it did not actually sell securi-
ties to the plaintiff. See Katz v. Amos Treat & Co., 411 F.2d 1046, 1053 (2d Cir. 1969);
Murphy v. Cady, 30 F. Supp. 466, 469-70 (D. Me. 1939), afFd, 113 F.2d 988 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 311 U.S. 705 (1940). See generally Rapp, supra note 74, at 454-56 (discus-
sion of cases using solicitation approach); Schneider, supra note 72, at 240-41, 263-76
(reevaluation of solicitation doctrine in light of Supreme Court views); Participant Liabil-
ity, supra note 79, at 532-36 (solicitation test applied to attorneys).
90. See, e.g., Croy v. Campbell, 624 F.2d 709, 713 (5th Cir. 1980) ("broad construc-
tion. . . should be given to the Act in order to effectuate its remedial purpose"); In re
Caesars Palace See. Litig., 360 F. Supp. 366, 382-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) ("courts have con-
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A small number of courts rejects such an inquiry. Specifically, these
courts believe that whether privity is required should be dictated by the
plain meaning of the statute without looking to legislative intent.9' The
Third Circuit has stated that it has "no difficulty in concluding" that, in
the absence of special circumstances, 92 "Congress intended the unambig-
uous language of Section 12(2) to mean exactly what it says."9 "
Yet this minority view is an unreasonably restrictive approach to a
statute that does not even use the term "privity"; 94 the statute merely
states that a defendant is liable to one who purchased from him."' While
tinually recognized the broad, remedial nature of the 1933 Act and the need to adopt a
liberal interpretation of the statute in order to best effectuate the congressional purpose");
Lennerth v. Mendenhall, 234 F. Supp. 59, 65 (N.D. Ohio 1964) (agent was tantamount to
a seller within the "liberal remedial spirit of the securities laws"); cf SEC v. Murphy, 626
F.2d 633, 641 (9th Cir. 1980) (exemptions from registration provisions should be con-
strued narrowly to further the purpose of the Act); Katz v. Amos Treat & Co., 411 F.2d
1046, 1052 (2d Cir. 1969) (limited construction of § 12(1)'s privity requirement, see supra
note 71, "does not accord with the language and the remedial purpose of the statute").
91. See, e.g., Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 619 F. 2d 1222, 1226 (7th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1005 (1981); Collins v. Signetics Corp., 605 F.2d 110, 113 (3d Cir.
1979); Unicorn Field, Inc. v. Cannon Group, Inc., 60 F.R.D. 217, 221-22 (S.D.N.Y.
1973). In Collins the court looked to legislative intent only to the extent that it is evi-
denced by the language of the statute. See 605 F.2d at 113.
The court in Davis v. Avco Fin. Servs., Inc., 739 F.2d 1057 (6th Cir. 1984), cert
denied, 105 S. Ct. 1359 (1985), which did not agree with the opinions above, stated:
"These courts put great emphasis on the consideration that the securities statutes are
indeed statutes, and not mere commissions to the federal courts to ride abroad on a great
white horse like the Lone Ranger righting all wrongs." Id at 1064 (emphasis in original);
see also Seller Liability, supra note 74, at 382 (courts construe statute according to plain
meaning because legislative history does not show contrary intention).
92. An example of special circumstances is a control relationship under § 15. See
Collins v. Signetics Corp., 605 F.2d 110, 112 (3d Cir. 1979). See also supra note 89.
93. Collins v. Signetics Corp., 605 F.2d 110, 113 (3d Cir. 1979). One reason some
courts insist on privity is that § 12(2) is based on common law rescission. See McFarland
v. Memorex Corp., 493 F. Supp. 631, 648 (N.D. Cal. 1980); Schneider, supra note 72, at
238 n.19. See supra note 74. As one court has stated, "It would seem natural to hold
only the actual party to the contract to provide such relief." Leanerth v. Mendenhall, 234
F. Supp. 59, 64 (N.D. Ohio 1964). The same court, however, continued: "On the other
hand, the spirit of the Acts would be defeated if such a narrow view would be adopted."
Id. Another court noted that the word "rescission" appears nowhere in the statute and
that there is no evidence that Congress intended such a limitation. See Cady v. Murphy,
113 F.2d 988, 991 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 705 (1940). Finally, even at common
law, "[w]hen rescission is based on a contract theory-mistake, or breach of contract-
only the party to the contract is liable. But, when it is predicated on fraud [as § 12(2) is],
privity is not essential." L. Loss, supra note 3, at 1183.
94. At least ten statutes within the United States Code contain the word "privity."
See, e.g., 30 U.S.C. § 229a(c) (1982) (government may develop wells drilled by persons
not in privity with one who holds lease for them); 35 U.S.C. § 182 (1982) (patent applica-
tion may be abandoned if inventor or one in privity with him published or disclosed
invention); 39 U.S.C. § 3012(a) (1983) (a person in privity with one who commits certain
mail fraud may be liable). The term is even used in the Securities Act. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 77(3) (1982) (an offer to buy does not include negotiations "among underwriters who
are or are to be in privity of contract with an issuer"). One can argue that if Congress
had really meant to require privity, it would have used the specific term instead of lan-
guage that may be considered to be more ambiguous.
95. See 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1982).
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it is not desirable for courts to assume the role of legislators, neither
should judges put on "blinders. .. obscuring from view everything but
the text of the statute."96 Generally, the plain meaning rule should be
used when statutory language is unambiguous,9 7 but courts are "increas-
ingly willing to consider other indicia of intent and meaning from the
start rather than beginning their inquiry by considering only the lan-
guage of the act.""5
Congress intended the Securities Act to encourage a free flow of infor.
mation about distributed securities99 and to set high standards of conduct
for those involved in securities offerings.100 These goals reflected two
causes of the 1929 stock market crash: investor ignorance' 01 and abuses
96. 2A N. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 46.02, at 81 (C. Sands rev. 4th
ed. 1984).
97. Id. § 46.01, at 74.
98. Id. § 46.07, at 110. "The literal interpretation of the words of an act should not
prevail if it creates a result contrary to the apparent intention of the legislature and if the
words are sufficiently flexible to allow a construction which will effectuate the legislative
intention." .d. See supra note 90. The words used in § 12(2) may be considered flexible
because they do not include the word "privity." See supra note 94 and accompanying
text.
99. In President Roosevelt's message to Congress regarding federal securities legisla-
tion, he asked Congress to assure that "every issue of new securities to be sold in inter.
state commerce shall be accompanied by full publicity and information, and that no
essentially important element attending the issue shall be concealed from the buying pub-
lic." President's Message, supra note 55, reprinted in 1 J. Ellenberger & E. Mahar, supra
note 55, at Item 3. Congress agreed. Said Representative Mapes: "[T]he chief and pri-
mary accomplishment of the legislation [will be to] make available to the public the infor-
mation upon which the public is asked to invest its money." 77 Cong. Rec. 2912 (1933),
reprinted in 1 J. Ellenberger & E. Mahar, supra note 55, at Item 7. For further discussion
of this issue, see remarks of Representatives Rayburn, 77 Cong. Rec. 2918, 2919 (1933),
and Wolverton, 77 Cong. Rec. 2931 (1933), reprinted in I J. Ellenberger & E. Mahar,
supra note 55, at Item 7.
A number of cases have reiterated this congressional intent. See, e.g., Croy v. Camp-
bell, 624 F.2d 709, 712 (5th Cir. 1980) (quoting Chris-Craft Indus. v. Piper Aircraft
Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 357 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973)); Wasson v. SEC,
558 F.2d 879, 886 (8th Cir. 1977); see also R. Jennings & H. Marsh, supra note 9, at 23
(one objective of the Act was to provide investors with information about securities).
100. The President's message suggested that securities legislation "should give impetus
to honest dealing in securities and thereby bring back public confidence." President's
Message, supra note 55, reprinted in 1 J. Ellenberger & E. Mahar, supra note 55, at Item
3. Debate in Congress echoed this sentiment. For example, Representative Greenwood
commented that
many of the leading bankers of the country no longer have the old-time sense of
ethics or [pay] attention to the strict detail of honest business like the bankers of
a former day. . . .The sale of. . .securities has reached a point where it is a
scandal and a gigantic racket in America, and the Federal Government is the
agency to stop it.
77 Cong. Rec. 2914 (1933), reprinted in 1 J. Ellenberger & E. Mahar, supra note 55, at
Item 7; see also R. Jennings & H. Marsh, supra note 9, at 23 (one objective of the Act was
to prohibit misrepresentation, deceit and other fraudulent practices in sales of securities);
Greene, Responsibilities of Underwriters, supra note 4, at 756 (Act's broad objective was
to protect investors by preserving honesty and fair dealing in investment banking indus-
try; disclosure was expected to improve corporate conduct and business practices).
101. See 77 Cong. Rec. 2918 (1933) (remarks of Rep. Rayburn) ("[T]he American
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of the system by securities professionals."°2 Because of the Act's broad
legislative intent, 0 3 many courts have construed provisions such as sec-
tion 12(2) liberally when such construction is necessary to protect inves-
tors"° or chastise those responsible for fraudulent securities offerings."0 5
Courts refusing to read the statute broadly often base their reasoning
on what they perceive to be the Supreme Court's nonexpansive approach
to securities law. 106 One observer noted in 1977 that the Court has re-
peatedly found for defendants and "enunciated principles that may cir-
cumscribe the rights of plaintiffs under the federal securities laws for
many years to come."'' 0 7 Indeed, the Court has limited implied causes of
action,108 the definitions of "security""' 9 and "materiality,"'"10 and at
people pay to be gulled.") (quoting P.T. Barnum), reprinted in I J. Ellenberger & E.
Mahar, supra note 55, at Item 7. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
102. The President stated: "IT]he public in the past has sustained severe losses through
practices neither ethical nor honest on the part of many persons and corporations selling
securities." President's Message, supra note 55, reprinted in 1 J. Ellenberger & E. Mahar,
supra note 55, at Item 3. Members of Congress agreed. "[H]onest and legitimate indus-
try. . . has been. . . made the victim of greedy and ruthless investment bankers." 77
Cong. Rec. 2925 (1933) (remarks of Rep. Kelly), reprinted in 1 J. Ellenberger & E. Ma-
har, supra note 55, at Item 7; see also Greene, Responsibilities of Underwriters, supra note
4, at 757 ("the untoward conduct of some investment bankers during the rampant specu-
lation of the 1920's brought discredit upon the entire banking industry"). See supra note
100 and accompanying text.
103. Not only was the intent of this Act broad and remedial; it was also clear and for
the most part unanimous. Debate in Congress centered on the specifics of the Act rather
than on the need for legislation, which seems to have been taken for granted. According
to Rep. Shannon, there was "not a member of [the] House on either side whose heart
[was] not in sympathy with remedial legislation along the lines proposed in this mea-
sure." 77 Cong. Rec. 2914 (1933), reprinted in I J. Ellenberger & E. Mahar, supra note
55, at Item 7.
104. Kaminsky, supra note 72, at 239 & n.38. See supra note 90.
105. See, e.g., Wasson v. SEC, 558 F.2d 879, 886 (8th Cir. 1977); Lennerth v. Menden-
hall, 234 F. Supp. 59, 65 (N.D. Ohio 1964); cf Chris-Craft Indus. v. Piper Aircraft Corp.,
480 F.2d 341, 357 (2d Cir.) (issuer, investment banker and others were liable under
§ 14(e) of the Exchange Act), cerL denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973). See supra note 90.
106. See Davis v. Avco Fin. Servs., Inc., 739 F.2d 1057, 1069 (6th Cir. 1984) (Lively,
J., dissenting), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1359 (1985); SEC v. Seaboard Corp. (Seaboard II),
677 F.2d 1301, 1311 n.12 (9th Cir. 1982); Collins v. Signetics Corp., 605 F.2d 110, 113
(3d Cir. 1979); McFarland v. Memorex Corp., 493 F. Supp. 631, 647-48 (N.D. Cal.
1980).
107. Lowenfels, supra note 57, at 892; see also Schneider, supra note 72, at 239
(Supreme Court has dramatically restricted scope of securities laws); Steinberg, supra
note 57, at 557 (Court has strictly construed some provisions and limited implied rights).
Yet even Lowenfels notes that the Supreme Court does not rely solely on statutory
construction:
[T]he Supreme Court's reputation for classical strict construction is a myth.
The Court is pragmatic. It desires to reach a particular result, and it will utilize
whatever processes of reasoning it finds helpful to achieve that result [such as)
word-by-word statutory analysis[,1. . . legislative history[,]. . . policy consid-
erations and common sense.
Lowenfels, supra note 57, at 921.
108. See Lowenfels, supra note 57, at 914-19; Schneider, supra note 72, at 236; Stein-
berg, supra note 57, at 557; see, e.g., Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 34, 35 (1977)
(no implied right of action under antifraud provision of Williams Act); Securities Inves-
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least one section of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.111 Yet the
Supreme Court has not ruled on the section 12(2) privity issue,"1 2 and it
does not seem wise to rely solely upon a general trend that is not binding
on the Court or lower courts.11 3 The Supreme Court has never aban-
doned Congress' goal of investor protection; in fact, it has stressed this
goal in several recent decisions.1 1 4
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue, at least one
lower court has considered the application of section 12(2)'s privity re-
quirement to managing underwriters. Klein v. Computer Devices, Inc. I"s
demonstrates the dilemma courts may have with this issue. In Klein sev-
eral shareholders claimed to have suffered losses from their investment in
Computer Devices, Inc. (CDI), which went bankrupt several months af-
ter its initial public offering. 16 The investors sued CDI, various officers
and directors of the company, and A.G. Becker Paribas, Inc. (Becker),
the lead underwriter of the offering." I 7 Most of the plaintiff shareholders
had purchased their shares from underwriters other than Becker." 8
In a motion for summary judgment, the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York ruled that a managing under-
tor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 423 (1975) (no implied right of action
under Securities Investor Protection Act). But see Transamerica Mortgage Advisors,
Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 18-19 (1979) (implying a right to relief under § 215 of the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940); Hazen, The Supreme Court and the Securities Laws:
Has the Pendulum Slowed?, 30 Emory L.J. 5, 15 (1981) ("Court has been careful to avoid
denying implied remedies to all private litigants"). See supra note 57.
109. See Hazen, supra note 108, at 7-11; Lowenfels, supra note 57, at 906-11; see, e.g.,
United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 848-51 (1975) (shares in a state
financed apartment project were not securities).
110. See Lowenfels, supra note 57, at 911-14; see, e.g., TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc.,
426 U.S. 438, 445, 449 (1976) (omitted fact in proxy statement is material if there is
substantial likelihood a shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote;
lower court's standard was "might" not "would").
11. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 212 (1976) (requiring scienter in
§ 10(b) actions); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 749 (1975) (lim-
iting classes of potential plaintiffs in § 10(b) actions); Steinberg, supra note 57, at 561-62
(Supreme Court has limited scope of §10(b)). See supra note 57.
112. Most recently the Court denied a petition for certiorari in Davis v. Avco Fin.
Servs., Inc., 739 F.2d 1057 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1359 (1985). In Davis
the Sixth Circuit noted that the Supreme Court has never passed on the § 12(2) privity
issue. See id. at 1060; Seller Liability, supra note 74, at 365.
113. In any case, this trend may be changing. See Hazen, supra note 108, passim;
Steinberg, supra note 57, at 560-71.
114. "[T]he Court's recent decisions . . . reflect a concern with investor protection
and the integrity of the marketplace." Steinberg, supra note 57, at 562; see id. at 558 &
n.5, 562-64. For Supreme Court cases reflecting this concern, see Rubin v. United States,
449 U.S. 424, 431 (1981) (scope of §17(a) of Securities Act); Chiarella v. United States,
445 U.S. 222, 227-29 (1980) (insider trading).
115. 591 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), modified on rehearing, 602 F. Supp. 837
(S.D.N.Y. 1985).
116. See Smith, Revenge of the Nerds, Forbes, Oct. 22, 1984, at 102.
117. Klein, 591 F. Supp. at 272.
118. See id. at 274.
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writer may indeed be liable to those who were not its direct customers. '19
Judge Goettel's opinion recognized the split among the circuits on the
privity issue120 and found that controlling law in the Second Circuit fa-
vors a more liberal interpretation of the statute.12 1 The Klein court ap-
peared to prefer a test that combined several theories"2 but it did not
rule out any of them.12
3
On a motion for reargument of the section 12(2) issue, however, the
Klein court retreated from its original stance, holding that an under-
writer that performs only the typical duties of the syndicate manager
may not be liable to other underwriters' customers. 2 The court did not
reject the various theories it had espoused earlier but found that normal
managing underwriter duties do not constitute the participation envi-
sioned by these theories.'25 This position is untenable. It is difficult to
imagine a case in which the normal role of a managing underwriter does
not dwarf that of any other actor besides the issuer. Yet the Klein court
advocated making attorneys and agents liable when their involvement in
an offering is substantial enough.' 26 If a court accepts the weakening of
the section 12(2) privity requirement in these circumstances, there is no
reason not to do so for managing underwriters.
The second Klein opinion relies heavily on a suggestion by defendant
119. See id. at 276.
120. See id. at 274-75.
121. The court relied heavily on Katz v. Amos Treat & Co., 411 F.2d 1046 (2d Cir.
1969), in determining Second Circuit law. See Klein, 591 F. Supp. at 275. In Katz, an
investor sued a number of defendants, including a stock brokerage firm and its president,
directors of the issuer, and a lawyer. See 411 F.2d at 1049. Plaintiff claimed both a lack
of registration of the securities in question and misrepresentation in their offer and sale.
Id. The court used a "solicitation" approach in finding that certain defendants had been
involved enough in the transaction to warrant liability. Id. at 1053. Katz has been inter-
preted as adopting "an extremely liberal standard of privity in §12(2) situations" and
"requiring only some indicia of participation or solicitation" by the defendant, see In re
Caesars Palace Sec. Litig., 360 F. Supp. 366, 380 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), even though the Katz
court limited its discussion of privity to claims under § 12(1), see 411 F.2d at 1052-53.
122. "[T]he plaintiffs' section 12(2) claims must be allowed to stand since they include
allegations that the defendants substantially participated in the sale of CDI stock to the
plaintiffs." Klein, 591 F. Supp. at 276 (footnote omitted). "Substantial participation" is a
hybrid of the phrases "significant participation" and "substantial factor," which are used
more frequently. The Klein court's phrase is indicative of the overlap between theories
and, perhaps, of the confusion of many opinions with regard to these theories. See supra
note 87.
123. Indeed, the court noted plaintiffs' allegations that "defendants participated and/or
aided and abetted or conspired with each other in the preparation of the prospectus [and
that they] played an active and substantial role in promoting and providing assistance in
the sale of the CDI stock to the plaintiffs and that these acts proximately caused or were a
substantialfactor in causing the sale of the stock to the plaintiffs." Klein, 591 F. Supp. at
276 (emphases added).
124. See Klein, 602 F. Supp. at 840.
125. See id. at 840-41.
126. For example, the Klein court cited with approval Junker v. Crory, 650 F.2d 1349
(5th Cir. 1981) (holding attorney liable under § 12(2)), see 591 F. Supp at 274 & n.13, and
SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1289 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding agent liable under
§ 12(2)), see 591 F. Supp. at 274 & n.l1.
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Becker that section 12(2) must be read in conjunction with section
11(e),'2 7 which, as noted earlier, limits an underwriter's liability to the
price of securities it underwrites. 2 ' Naturally, plaintiffs responded that
the exception to this limit was meant specifically to reach managing un-
derwriters.' 29 In rejecting this argument the Klein court regrettably did
not give its view on whom this exception was intended to reach if not the
manager. The Klein opinion also declined to address any general reasons
for or against treating managing underwriters differently from partici-
pants. Yet sound policy dictates that section 12(2) not be read so liter-
ally as to preclude the liability of one who is as intimately involved in a
securities offering as is a managing underwriter.
B. Policy Arguments for Expansion of Managing Underwriters'
Liability
A number of policy considerations unique to lead underwriters sup-
port an expansion of their liability. Perhaps most important is the re-
sponsibility of a managing underwriter for assuring the accuracy of a
prospectus. 3  It has already been noted that the lead underwriter's in-
vestigation of an issuer is usually the final word on the subject."' If the
lead underwriter is the sole representative of the syndicate to become
involved in prospectus preparation, 131 any investor should be able to seek
compensation from this underwriter for material misrepresentations.
Furthermore, an investor may reasonably rely on the reputation of the
managing underwriter in deciding to buy securities. 33 The inclusion of a
highly respected investment banking firm's name at the top of a tomb-
stone advertisement's list of underwriters1 34 increases the credibility of
127. See id. at 840. The court did not explain why the two sections must be read
together. Such a conclusion is unwarranted because § I l(e) limits an underwriter's liabil-
ity "in any suit. . . authorized under subsection (a) of this section." 15 U.S.C. §77k(e)
(1982) (emphasis added). Thus, the statute expressly confines its liability limit to § 11.
128. See id. § 77k(e); Klein, 602 F. Supp. at 840. See supra note 62 and accompanying
text.
129. See id. at 840. See supra notes 63-69 and accompanying text.
130. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 38, 39 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 38, 39 and accompanying text.
133. See In re Gap Stores Sec. Litig., 79 F.R.D. 283, 299 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (citing
Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 696 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)); L. Loss, supra
note 3, at 1041 ("prospective investors rely on the reputation of the underwriters"); Folk
II, supra note 33, at 54 (investors assume that "a house of outstanding reputation will not
take on a 'cat-and-dog' issue"); Tyler, supra note 17, at 920 (even SEC administrators
"draw comfort from the fact that a reputable underwriter stands behind" an issue). This
reliance was probably a factor in the enactment of the Act itself. See 77 Cong. Rec. 2929
(1933) (remarks of Rep. Pettengill) ("The small investor relies almost exclusively upon
the [investment] banker for his knowledge and judgment as to the quality of the security,
and it is this which makes his relation to the banker one of confidence.") (quoting L.
Brandeis, Other People's Money and How the Bankers Use It), reprinted in 1 J. El-
lenberger & E. Mahar, supra note 55, at Item 7.
134. See R. Jennings & H. Marsh, supra note 9, at 19 ("On the 'tombstone ad' the
managing underwriter or underwriters will receive top billing.").
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an issuer previously unknown to the public.135
Yet an underwriter may have motives that are not always beneficial to
investors. One commentator has noted that an underwriter has three
major interests which sometimes overlap and often conflict: its own
profit, success for its client (the issuer) and protection of investors.'3 6
The structure of the underwriting process itself produces forces that
work against total disclosure. In a firm commitment arrangement each
underwriter has taken on the risk that the securities will not sell.' 3 1 In a
best efforts underwriting the underwriter's profit depends on commis-
sions, so sales are important here too.13s Moreover, in either arrange-
ment profits depend on the price of the securities as well as the number of
sales. 139 A more optimistic-if not entirely accurate-prospectus may
increase both the market price and sales;"4 this puts a strain on an in-
vestment banker's integrity and investigative efforts.' Such economic
factors affect every underwriter in the syndicate, but only the lead under-
135. See Halleran & Calderwood, supra note 15, at 89 (lead underwriter impliedly
endorses issuer's financial integrity and security's merits). In debate over the Act, Repre-
sentative McFadden stated: "[T]he public is being exploited by banking houses of that
reputation [referring to J.P. Morgan & Co.], whose very names lend confidence to the
public [about securities that] are not worth the paper they are written on." 77 Cong. Rec.
2930 (1933), reprinted in 1 J. Ellenberger & E. Mahar, supra note 55, at Item 7.
136. See Wolfson, supra note 4, at 365, 373. The underwriter's interest in profit is
especially strong because securities are sold and not bought, see id., passim; that is, hard-
sell techniques may be necessary to get a new issue off the ground. The high profits
involved in an underwriting-as opposed to trading-increase this incentive. See Tyler,
supra note 17, at 919. As for the client's interests, underwriters should be suspicious of
the issuer's statements because they may be self-serving, unduly enthusiastic or deliber-
ately false. See Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 696-97 (S.D.N.Y.
1968).
Wolfson notes a fourth area of conflict that results when an investment banking firm is
involved in both underwriting and retail brokerage distribution. The major problems
with such arrangements are that the investment banker, because of its relationship with
the issuer, may oversell an issue to retail clients, and that it may violate the issuer's
confidence by alerting retail customers to buy or sell opportunities in the issuer. Wolfson,
supra note 4, at 366-67. This conflict, while undoubtedly a serious one, is less relevant to
the question of managing underwriters' liability because the problem may occur with any
underwriter.
137. See Wolfson, supra note 4, at 374. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 13, 14 and accompanying text. "Even when the investment
banker acts as agent, rather than as principal for his own account, the temptation to puff
the securities is enormous, because the investment banker receives three or four times or
more the commissions normally applicable to ordinary transactions." Wolfson, supra
note 4, at 374.
139. See supra note 29.
140. This premise is not entirely unimpeachable. Some commentators have noted that
many or most individual investors do not read or understand the prospectus. See Hall-
eran & Calderwood, supra note 15, at 96; Wolfson, supra note 4, at 381. However, if a
broker who reads and is convinced by an optimistic prospectus pushes a certain security,
the sales as well as the price of that security may rise. It should be noted that there is a
serious potential conflict in this area when a firm acts as both investment banker and
retail broker. See supra note 136.
141. See Wolfson, supra note 4, at 373-74.
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writer is in a position to assert some control over their abuse by ensuring
the accuracy of the prospectus.
The manner in which an underwriter is chosen may also have subtle
implications for disclosure. In a negotiated underwriting, the investment
banking firm that gets the deal may not want to offend its client by ap-
pearing too eager either to investigate the issue or to word the prospectus
negatively.142 The issuer and underwriter may have a longstanding and
amicable affiliation that the underwriter does not wish to disturb, 143 or
the issuer may be a new client, in which case their relationship may be
even more fragile.'" To make matters worse, in economically troubled
times the pressure to maintain clients increases.145 In a competitively bid
deal the underwriting groups submitting bids have little incentive to be-
gin a thorough investigation of the issuer because there is no guarantee of
getting the deal.' 46 Once a bid is accepted, time constraints may affect
the accuracy of the prospectus. 147
Because in each of these cases the interests of an investment banking
firm in itself and its client are likely to overwhelm its desire to protect
142. Wolfson quotes several investment bankers who testified at the SEC Hot Issue
Hearings of 1972. One stated: "In view of the good reputation and demonstrated record
of success, at least in the stock market, of the. . . promoters, we were indeed flattered to
be selected as the underwriter. It would have been regarded as poor taste if we had made
any further investigations of the company. . . ." Wolfson, supra note 4, at 373 (quoting
SEC Hot Issue Hearings of 1972). Another admitted: "In any event, we made no further
investigation of the company, the industry or the management except that both my part-
ner and I visited the company's restaurant where we each ate a hamburger with no ill
effects." Id. at 373 (same).
143. See Halleran & Calderwood, supra note 15, at 88-89 (lead underwriter has close
contacts with issuer, sometimes extending over a long period of time). The affiliation
between issuer and underwriter may be so close that key employees of the investment
banking firm serve on the issuer's board. Greene, Responsibilities of Underwriters, supra
note 4, at 791 & n.224; Wolfson, supra note 4, at 367, 374; see, e.g., Escott v. BarChris
Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 692 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). Interlocking directorates were so
widespread in the days before the Securities Act was passed that many believed that the
Act should prevent them outright. See 77 Cong. Rec. 2932 (1933) (remarks of Rep.
Marland), reprinted in I J. Ellenberger & E. Mahar, supra note 55, at Item 7. This view
did not prevail, but it was hoped that the Act would have some effect on this practice.
See id. at 2929 (remarks of Rep. Pettengill) ("This bill does not directly strike at inter-
locking directorates, but one of its great benefits should be that it indirectly does so by
making the responsibility of corporate directors such that few men can afford to sit on
more than one or two corporate boards," making it difficult for one person to be on both
sides of a trade.), reprinted in I J. Ellenberger & E. Mahar, supra note 55, at Item 7.
144. See Wolfson, supra note 4, at 369 (some investment banking firms engage in ag-
gressive competition for new clients).
145. See Greene, Responsibilities of Underwriters, supra note 4, at 761 ("increasingly
competitive climate" of industry may be causing some underwriters to skimp on investi-
gations when trying to keep clients); see also Wolfson, supra note 4, at 369-70 (economy
has forced many investment banking firms out of business).
146. Greene, Responsibilities of Underwriters, supra note 4, at 764, 792 & n.229; Hall-
eran & Calderwood, supra note 15, at 104; Wolfson, supra note 4, at 371, 419 n.1. The
group that wins relies on the issuer's bidding prospectus and registration statement, both
of which were prepared by the issuer and its lawyers. Id. at 371, 372, 425 n.32.
147. Wolfson, supra note 4, at 419 n. 1 (competitive bidding has led to insufficient dis-
closure in utility issues due to time factor).
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investors, courts may need to fill this role. In fact, this situation-in
which an underwriter's avarice or its legitimate business goals interfere
with full disclosure-is exactly what Congress intended the Act to rem-
edy.14 8 To deter such behavior, additional liability should be placed on
those whose responsibility for the information is greatest.' 4 9 After all,
many other actors in the process have been held liable, including brokers
who were not involved in prospectus preparation. 5 '
The counterargument is that such potentially enormous liability will
"chill" underwriting. 5' This will be particularly true, it has been sug-
gested, in high risk and high technology industries.'" 2 In the former,
chances are greater that an issuer will fold, leaving disappointed purchas-
ers eager to find a scapegoat.15 1 In the latter, the complex and scientific
nature of the industry may make errors in a prospectus more difficult to
discern. 15
4
Yet these are precisely the cases in which investor protection is most
needed. An error that is difficult for a securities professional to spot will
be virtually impossible for the average investor to discover,' 55 and infor-
mation about risky issuers is crucial.' 56 Underwriters of these securities
148. See supra notes 99-103 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 32-34, 100, 102, and accompanying text.
150. See, e.g., Lewis v. Walston & Co., 487 F.2d 617, 621 (5th Cir. 1973); Murphy v.
Cady, 30 F. Supp. 466, 469 (D. Me. 1939), aft'd, 113 F.2d 988 (Ist Cir.), cert denied, 311
U.S. 705 (1940); Peterson, supra note 74, at 278; Schneider, supra note 72, at 238 & n. 17,
241 & n.35; Participant Liability, supra note 79, at 533.
151. See Brodsky, supra note 42, at 2, col. 2; Smith, supra note 116, at 102.
152. See Greene, Underwriters Nervous, supra note 48, at 164 (increased liability may
chill underwriting of high tech issues); Smith, supra note 116, at 102 (offerings of corpo-
rations in emerging or high risk industries will be particularly chilled); see also Greene,
Responsibilities of Underwriters, supra note 4, at 802-03 (if these issues are "hot"-that is,
their price is expected to rise quickly-negligence by underwriters is even more likely).
153. While the problem is certainly not as great as it was before the Securities Act was
passed, securities with extremely questionable prospects are still issued. By one estimate,
at least $100 million in worthless new securities are sold each year. Tyler, supra note 17,
at 899.
154. Greene, Underwriters Nervous, supra note 48, at 164. For example, in Klein v.
Computer Devices, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), modified on rehearing, 602 F.
Supp. 837 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), plaintiffs' complaint alleged that the issuer's prospectus failed
to disclose the fact that its primary product, a portable computer, was substantially un-
marketable because it used a 3.5 inch disk drive rather than a 5.25 inch disk drive. See id.
at 279 n.27; Plaintiff Davella's Amended Complaint 11, at 6-7, Klein v. Computer
Devices, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), modified on rehearing, 602 F. Supp. 837
(S.D.N.Y. 1985).
155. A prospectus is difficult enough for the average investor to understand, see Wolf-
son, supra note 4, at 378-81, and technical language about an issuer's industry may inten-
sify this problem. An underwriter, on the other hand, may retain experts to appraise
highly technical issues. See Greene, Underwriters Nervous, supra note 48, at 164.
156. A huge number of the securities issued in the 1920's turned out to be worthless.
Representative Bulwinkle remarked in debate over the Act:
[F]or the past ten years the United States has been flooded with not only worth-
less stock but fraudulent stock as well. The amount in value that the people of
the United States paid for the securities is purely a conjecture, but it is safe to
say that it runs well into the billions.
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should be forced to take greater care. If the risk is so great that no un-
derwriter wishes to disclose fully the bad news, the public is probably
better off if the securities are never offered. Furthermore, a "chill" today
in the underwriting field is better than allowing investors to become so
disenchanted with the securities markets that they invest elsewhere.
1 7
Finally, it should be noted that when the Securities Act was passed in
the early 1930's, many securities professionals and others believed that
certain provisions, such as section 11, would spell the end of the indus-
try."'58 Instead the Act has led to higher standards of integrity and a
generally well run and self-policed investment banking profession. 5 9 In
the same manner, expanded liability for managing underwriters will not
bring ruin upon the industry but will produce a more honest and meticu-
lous system.
C. Indemnification and Contribution
If managing underwriters' liability is expanded, questions remain
about their ability to spread this risk among other underwriters. Under-
writing syndicates are formed to limit liability as well as distribute busi-
ness risks,"r and the underwriting agreement usually provides for
several, but not joint, liability. 6 '
As a result of this arrangement, a managing underwriter liable to other
underwriters' customers may not be able to obtain contribution from fel-
77 Cong. Rec. 2924 (1933), reprinted in 1 J. Ellenberger & E. Mahar, supra note 55, at
Item 7. Those who passed the Act evidently believed that full disclosure about risky
businesses would reduce the fraud perpetrated on investors. See supra notes 99-103 and
accompanying text. See also 77 Cong. Rec. 2929 (1933) (remarks of Rep. Pettengill) ("In
practice the banker gets the higher commission for underwriting the weaker security, on
the ground that his own risk is greater. And the weaker the security the greater is the
banker's incentive to induce his customers to relieve him.") (quoting L. Brandeis, Other
People's Money and How the Bankers Use It), reprinted in 1 J. Ellenberger & E. Mahar,
supra note 55, at Item 7; Wolfson, supra note 4, at 366 ("A risky venture may ... boost
underwriters' compensation to six or seven times the secondary market rate," providing a
marketing incentive that may not be in the public's best interest).
157. See Smith, supra note 116, at 102.
158. See L. Loss, supra note 3, at 1017, 1029. This fear continued even after the Act
had passed. Senator Walcott warned in 1934: "[T]he Securities Act is going to appear in
glaring fashion as a restrictive and almost a paralyzing measure. It will so restrict busi-
ness that business will not be able to finance its requirements properly." 78 Cong. Rec.
8700 (1934).
159. See Greene, Responsibilities of Underwriters, supra note 4, at 757 & n.9 (federal
securities laws have become "a basic part of the mores of business" and have made the
financial community largely self-policing); Halleran & Calderwood, supra note 15, at 96,
118 (Act has "undoubtedly contributed greatly to improving standards of corporate mo-
rality and the practices of the financial community"; this community is generally self-
policing).
160. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
161. L. Loss, supra note 3, at 86; Halleran & Calderwood, supra note 15, at 99; see In
re Gap Stores See. Litig., 79 F.R.D 283, 289 (N.D. Cal. 1978). "The main attribute of a
joint liability, as distinguished from a several or a joint and several liability, is the right of
one joint obligor to insist that his co-obligor be joined as a co-defendant with him, i.e.:
that they be sued jointly." Schram v. Perkins, 38 F. Supp. 404, 407 (E.D. Mich. 1941).
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low syndicate members.' 62 Moreover, an investment banking firm may
be hesitant to ask others for contribution as "this is not likely to win [it]
any popularity contests on Wall Street,"' 63 but perhaps firms should take
this into account when accepting the lead underwriting position and
when investigating an issuer. Indemnification is still more unlikely as it
involves shifting the entire loss to another based on the other's complete
fault. 16
As for other underwriters in the syndicate, the possibility of contribu-
tion may provide an incentive for them to change their practice of blindly
relying on the assurances of the lead underwriter.' 65 Even so, because
their agreement calls for several liability, if participating underwriters are
impleaded they will still not be liable for more than their pro rata share
of the offering.' 66 As their liability will always be limited, these under-
writers will probably tend not to exercise maximum care in the under-
writing process. This further supports an increase in the liability of
managing underwriters.
CONCLUSION
The responsibilities of managing underwriters in the public offering
process exceed those of any other underwriter. The potential liability of
managers should be commensurate with this role. An expansion in this
area is most likely to occur through use of section 12(2) of the Securities
Act. Courts should allow this section to be used to reach managing un-
derwriters because expanded liability will force them to be especially con-
scientious in their public offering participation.
Dana B. Klinges
162. See Brodsky, supra note 42, at 2. Brodsky states that "[w]hether contribution is
available is an open question because the acts of the managing underwriter. . . are differ-
ent from the more passive participation of the other dealers in the underwriting." Id.; see
Kaminsky, supra note 72, at 288 ("It may be argued that. . . courtfs] should adopt a
comparative fault test and apportion liability accordingly.").
163. Smith, supra note 116, at 102; see Brodsky, supra note 42, at 2.
164. For a discussion of the distinction between contribution and indemnification, see
D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, D. Owen, W. Prosser & W. Keeton on The Law of Torts 341 (5th
ed. 1984). The "Underwriting Agreement," see supra note 30, usually provides for in-
demnification of the underwriters by the issuer, but only if the latter is at fault. See
Halleran & Calderwood, supra note 15, at 99; Weiss, The Undenvriting Agreement-
Form and Commentary, 26 Bus. Law. 647, 660-63 (1971). But see Globus v. Law Re-
search Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1288 (2d Cir. 1969) (underwriter with actual knowl-
edge of misstatement may not enforce indemnification agreement), cert. denied, 387 U.S.
813 (1970); Koch, Attorneys' Liability: The Securities Bar and the Impact of National
Student Marketing, 14 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 883, 897 (1973) (ramifications of Globus
decision).
165. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
166. The agreement limits a participating underwriter's liability, see supra note 161,
and there is no theory under which a participating underwriter would be liable for more
than its pro rata share of the offering.
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